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I.  INTRODUCTION
Despite the damage caused by the recent Enron scandal1, the asset securitization 
market has been vibrant and has become a popular financing alternative2.  A number of 
academics emphasize its merits and suggest that it is a more favorable way of financing, 
and Congress’s proposal to make sales of asset in securitization immune from 
characterization as secured transactions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 20013 (the 
“Reform Act”) almost materialized when the Enron scandal hit the scene.  Conversely, 
there have been accusations that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing 
because, for example, it fosters fraudulent transactions.
Why are there such divergent views?  This divergence may derive from the all-
encompassing definition of “securitization.”  Securitization transactions, while possessing 
certain common characteristics, cover a wide variety of asset classes and structures4, and 
confusion arises when addressing the subject without attention to nuances.5  This paper 
attempts to show that securitization is not necessarily “efficient” when the originator 
becomes financially distressed and the securitized asset was a type of asset the unsecured 
creditors do not expect to be subject to securitization.
Section II defines the term “efficient.”  Section III talks about a debtor’s financial 
status at the time of securitization transaction.  Financially distressed companies have a 
tendency to overinvest6 and this could cause “inefficiency.”  Section IV discusses the 
impact of asset classes on securitization, focusing on the difference between traditional 
and non-traditional securitization assets.  “Inefficiency” with respect to the former asset 
class may eventually fade out but it will persist for the latter.  Section V discusses the 
implications of securitization not always being “efficient.”  
a. Defining Securitization
Securitization is a structure in which a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is created 
and securities collateralized by the SPV’s asset are issued to the investors.7  The SPV 
may take a form of a regular corporation, partnership, or a trust.  Depending on the form 
of the SPV, the securities may be bonds or certificate of beneficial interest.  Unlike 
corporate bonds where investors look to the creditworthiness of the entire company asset 
back securities (ABS) investors rely primarily on the creditworthiness of the SPV’s assets 
to secure their investments.8
1 See In Re Enron, 235 F.Supp2d 549.  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of 
Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Enron & SPV]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1539 (2004) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Post-Enron].
2 Big Rise in ABS Issuance, Fin. Times, Feb. 17, 2005.
3 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).
4 See  STANDARD & POOR’S, LEGAL CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS, 
April, 2002.
5 See  Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: the Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 595 
(1998); Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra note 1.
6 See id., 1555-1563; Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 Journal of Fin Econ. 305-360 (1976).  




The securitization process starts with the sale of the asset, typically mortgages, 
credit card receivables, auto loans, equipment purchase loans, or student loans from the 
originator to the SPV.9  The SPV funds this sale via non-recourse loan and equity 
investment.10  The sale is carefully structured to be a “true sale,”11 ensuring that the 
originator does not retain the asset’s risk-return excessively and that fair value is received 
by the SPV in exchange for the asset.12  If the “true sale” threshold is not met with the 
result that the sale is recharacterized as disguised secured lending, the asset enters the 
originator’s estate and causes automatic stay to apply in the event of the originator’s 
bankruptcy.
The SPV is structured to be “bankruptcy remote.”13  In other words, measures are 
taken to prevent the SPV from going into voluntary or involuntary proceedings.  The 
articles of incorporation for the SPV specify the scope of its operation.  The articles 
typically specify that the operation’s scope is limited to an administrative function and 
that nothing more can be undertaken by the SPV.14  Typically the SPV limits itself to 
collecting the receivables, keeping the non-asset-related risk of its bankruptcy to 
minimal.  This also limits the number of trade creditors and thereby reduces the chances 
of involuntary bankruptcy.15  The articles may also specify that the SPV require a vote 
from at least one independent director of the board in order to file a voluntary 
bankruptcy.  Measures are taken to prevent “substantive consolidation” of the SPV and 
the originator as well.16  Courts substantively consolidate two entities if they find that the 
two entities’ structures and operations suggest they are actually one.17  If the SPV is 
consolidated into the originator when the originator goes into bankruptcy, the SPV’s 
assets enter the originator’s estate.  Therefore, typical SPV transactions are structured to 
provide separate bookkeeping for the activities of the originator and the SPV, to avoid 
any duplicative service, violation of the SPV corporate form, an overlap in the board of 
directors of both entities, and to strictly limit the originator’s involvement with the 
transferred asset.
Once the asset is transferred to the SPV, the SPV (or another SPV created by that 
SPV) issues new securities backed by the asset as collateral.  These securities are called 
ABS and purchasers of these securities are ABS investors.
b. Enron’s Use of the Special Purpose Vehicle
9 See  STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED FINANCE:  RATINGS TRANSACTIONS 2002, Jan. 31, 
2003.
10 See  OKAUCHI KOUSAKU, SHOUKEN-KA NYUMON [Introduction to Securitization], §2 (Nippon 
Keizai Shinbun Sha 2003 (1997).
11 SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, §4.
12 Id.
13 Id.§3.
14 See  id. §3:2.1.
15 See  id. §3.3.
16 I will hereinafter call the legal risk of the SPV pertaining to the originator’s bankruptcy, namely the risk 
of true sale recharacterization, the voluntary/involuntary bankruptcy filing risk of the SPV, and the 
substantive consolidation risk collectively as the “weak link” risk.
17 See id. §3.4.  The author lists factors typically given weight by the court in a substantive consolidation 
case.
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Enron used the SPV for purposes of double-dealing and hiding debt.18  Basically, 
Enron transferred its debts to SPVs and solicited investors by committing to pledge its 
own shares sufficient for repayment.19  This constituted self-dealings because Enron 
treated the SPVs as separate entities for accounting purposes, while they did not have
legally required 3% third-party equity investment.  Although the structure has an SPV as 
a component, the transactions here are not securitization because the investors’ risk-
return exposure was not only to the SPV’s assets but also to the guarantee by the 
originator in the form of share pledging.  This paper does not address Enron-style non-
securitization SPV transactions.
II.  DEFINITION OF “EFFICIENT” SECURITIZATION
This paper adopts Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard.  Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is 
found in the context of securitization when “the aggregate benefit to the parties to the 
securitization exceeds any net harm to other parties.”20 As the only “parties susceptible to 
being made worse off are the originator’s unsecured creditors”,21 a securitization 
transaction is “efficient” under this theory if the benefit to the originator and the ABS 
investors exceeds net harm to the originator’s unsecured creditors.22  This is the definition 
used in Professor Schwarcz’s Securitization Post-Enron,23 which will be discussed in the 
following sections.
III.  SOLVENCY
The financial status of the originator at the time of the securitization transaction
impacts the nature of the transaction immensely.  Some commentator dismisses this 
nuance by arguing it is unlikely that financially distressed companies engage in 
securitization.24  But there is evidence that suggest the contrary.  I would like to discuss 
this evidence first and then examine how the financial status of the originator could be a 
distinguishing factor of “efficient” and “inefficient” securitization.
a. Use of Securitization by Financially Distressed Companies
There are three reasons to believe that financially distressed companies would use 
securitization: (1) an increase in low-rated ABS;(2) an emergence of ways to hedge the 
risk of ABS; and (3) a diversified portfolio of ABS investors.
(1) Increase in Low-Rated ABS
The ABS market as a whole has experienced rapid growth over the past decade or 
so.25  But the growth has been more prominent among ABS with low rating (see Figure 
18 See  In Re  Enron, supra note 1;  Schwarcz, Enron & SPV, supra note 1.
19 In re Enron, supra, note 1.
20 Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra note 1, at 1553.
21 Id. at 1553.
22 See  Id.
23 Id.
24 See Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra note 1, at 1558; Steven L. Schwarcz, , The Alchemy of Asset 
Securitiztion, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, The Alchemy].
25 Compare Big Rise in ABS Issuance, supra note 2, and Phillip L. Zweig, Asset-Backed Securities, THE 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., Library of Economics and 
Liberty), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AssetBackedSecurities.html. The total issuance in 
2004 was $896.6 billion while in 1991 it was just $50.6 billion.
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1).26  In 1985, 87.5 percent of the ABS issuance was rated AAA.27 No ABS had been 
rated below A up to 1987.  Starting in 1993, the percentage of ABS below A rating grew 
quickly.  In 1995, AAA-rated ABS declined to 56 percent, and 8.2 percent of all was 
rated below A.  The proportion of AAA-rated ABS further declined to 42.6 percent in 
2002, while the proportion of ABS rated below A rose to 20.7%. Standard & Poor’s 
reports that this trend indicates that the ABS market is not strictly a “AAA” and “AA”
market any longer, offering investors lower-rated investments with various risk-and-
return options.”28
Figure 1
This trend suggests some investors are interested in ABS with relatively returns 
for taking higher risk.  The risk of the ABS could derive from various sources including 
the quality of the securitized assets and the soundness of the legal structure.  The 
transaction between LTV Steel and Abbey National is an example of investors’ interest in 
low-rated ABS.29 Abbey National purchased ABS of the LTV Steel’s inventory, which 
received a rating of BBB from Fitch Rating Services, Inc.  The low rating was due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the assets’ cash flow generating capabilities and legally risky 
structure.30  Successful engagement by the originator was necessary in order for the asset 
to successfully generate cash flow.  The originator would need to process the ore, market 
26 See, STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 7.
27 For the purpose of this section, I assume ABS rated by Standard & Poor’s as representing the whole ABS 
industry.
28 Id., at 10.
29 In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).  The debtor and investor tried to 
securitize the debtor’s inventory, legitimacy of which the court seemed to doubt.
30 Thomas E. Plank, 2004 Symposium: The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1655, 1688 (2004).
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the finished product, and consummate the sale before cash would be generated.  The 
structure was legally risky because the extent of the originator’s involvement affects the 
court’s willingness to bring in the SPV into the estate of the originator upon bankruptcy 
on the theory that the SPV is simply a conduit for the originator (substantive 
consolidation).  Another obvious risk is the court avoiding the asset transfer in 
bankruptcy.
LTV Steel emerged from its first bankruptcy on June 28, 1993.  The business 
performed reasonably well for several years, with a net income of $127.1 million in 1994.  
However, its performance deteriorated in 1997, its net income plunging to $30 million, as 
international competition intensified.  Soon after, in 1998, Abbey National purchased the
ABS from the SPV in the amount of $30 million.  Anyone who receives payments 90 
days before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is subject to a court’s decision to avoid such 
transfer.  In this case, Abbey National was aware of the debtor’s unfavorable financial 
state, the risk of avoidance concerning the transfer of the inventory to the SPV, the risk of 
substantive consolidation, and the uncertainty of the asset’s cash flow generating 
capability.  It nevertheless decided to take exposure to the said investment given the 
return the investment provided.31  These days’ investors are not necessarily looking for 
safe investments.  They are looking for investments that fit their risk-return profile.  As 
sophisticated investors strive to flexibly construct their portfolios and as they focus more 
and more on yields, the appetite for low-rated ABS continues to grow.
(2)  Hedging the SPV’s Credit Risk
Not long ago, an instrument called credit default swap emerged.  Credit default 
swap is a transaction where the parties are able to buy/sell the protection against a 
specified credit event occurring to a specified entity (a “reference entity”).  In general,
purchasers of the protection in a variation of credit default swap, credit default swap on 
ABS, are able to flexibly hedge the ABS’ risk.  Because the ABS purchasers will become 
better at controlling exposure to the instrument, the investors are expected to be more 
open to low-rated ABS.32
The credit default swap market went through an even more dramatic jump than 
the ABS counterpart.  The total of credit derivatives, a large portion of which is credit 
default swaps, rose from $180 billion in 1997 to $5,000 billion at the end of 2004.33 The 
most typical transaction is the corporate debt credit default swap.34  In the corporate debt 
credit default swap, the agreement specifies that the seller of the protection would pay the 
buyer a certain amount upon a default by the issuer of a certain corporate debt and that 
the seller receives from the buyer the premium for providing a protection against this 
contingent default.  Parties to the corporate debt credit default swap have a variety of 
reasons for their participation: “to hedge the risk on its balance sheet”; “to hedge 
counterparty risk”; “as an alternative to buying or selling a bond or loan”; “as a 
directional play on credit (as an arbitrage trade, for example)”; or “for market-making 
purposes.”
31 Id.
32 Paul Watterson, Craig Stein, and Kristin Boggiano, Credit default swaps on asset-backed securities, 
CREDIT MAGAZINE, Nov. 2002, at 2.
33 UK Warning on Credit Derivatives, Fin. Times, Feb. 23, 2005.
34 See  Watterson et al., supra note 29.
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A credit default swap on ABS is a variation of the aforementioned credit default 
swap.  The only difference is that the reference entity is an SPV created for purposes of 
structured finance.  Such SPV differs from regular companies in that it usually does not 
have a significant business operation.  Therefore, the SPV’s credit risk is the risk 
pertaining to the asset itself and to the legal aspect of the structured finance, notably a 
“weak link.”  A weak link is the risk of the originator’s bankruptcy affecting the SPV’s 
solvency.  It comprises avoidance and substantive consolidation where the transferred 
asset is brought into the originator’s estate for distribution to the originator’s creditors.  
ABS investors with large exposure to a certain ABS are able to use the credit default 
swap on ABS to hedge against the SPV’s bankruptcy.  The availability of such hedging 
instrument is expected to lessen the investors’ anxiety in purchasing ABS from the 
financially distressed originator.
(3)  Diversified Portfolio of ABS Investors
Flexibility and liquidity are two appealing aspects of ABS for investors.  Secured 
lenders are subject to the credit risk of the originator (delay in payments in the case of 
fully secured creditors).  Secured lenders’ commitments are typically large, although they 
could form syndication in order to lessen the extent of each participant’s commitment.   
In the securitization, by contrast, the risk-return exposure is limited to the asset’s risk.  
The small denominations in which ABS are available also reduces the risk- return 
exposure into smaller portions .  Exit from such investments is usually easier because 
there is often a secondary market.35   Consequently, the ABS investors are likely to have 
more diversified portfolios with relatively smaller commitments to each investment than 
secured lenders.  This implies that the ABS investors are likely to be less concerned with 
the risk of each ABS they own.  The cost of research would be greater than its benefit, 
and the investors may be willing to take a greater risk for some components of their 
portfolios when the exposure to each investment is small.  Thus, ABS investors are 
expected to have become less averse to ABS issued by financially distressed companies.
b. Impact of Originator’s Financial Status
The securitization technique is becoming popular among originators of different 
financial statuses.  But what are the implications of this expansion of the originator class?  
If the originator is financially distressed, it is more likely to embark upon overinvestment 
or risk-shifting behavior.36 The originator receives cash from the securitization 
transaction, and as the ABS investors provide no supervision on the use of the cash, the 
financially distressed originator is likely to take on projects whose net value may be 
positive to the shareholder but negative to the unsecured creditors.37
When the company has positive equity, its shareholders oversee the company and 
prevent it from engaging in a project with net negative present value.  This is not the case 
when the company has no positive equity.  In that case, the shareholders prefer the 
company to engage in a risky project with a high expected return in the hopes of realizing 
any potential return.  For example, assume there is a project that has a five percent chance 
35 See http://www.absnet.net.  This is a website dedicated to following more than 10,000 structured 
transactions in the secondary market, evidencing the existence of an active ABS secondary market.
36 Contrast  Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra, note 1, 1557-1562.  arguing that harms from the overinvestment 
is offset by the ABS’s lower interest rate and the prolonged life of the company.
37 See Jensen et al., supra, note 6.  See also  Lupica, supra note 5, at 629-630.
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of generating a thousand dollars and a ninety- five percent chance of losing a hundred 
dollars.  A hundred dollars, principal and interest, is owed to the unsecured creditors.  
When there is one hundred dollars in equity, the project would be rejected by the 
shareholders because the net value of the project is (1000x0.05-100x0.95=-45) and 
because they risk their equity being wiped out.  The creditors would not like the project 
either, because the project has a negative present value. On the other hand, if there is no 
equity, the shareholders have nothing to lose and the only way they can possibly get 
something is to take on this very risky project.  This is the risk-shifting problem for the 
creditors of financially distressed companies.38
The risk- shifting problem is universal and courts have been unsuccessful in 
curbing this problem.39  Recently, a Delaware chancery court held that the board directors 
of the financially distressed company owe a fiduciary duty not only to its shareholders 
but also to its creditors.40  The ruling cautioned the managers and directors not to yield to 
the pressure by the shareholders.  However, it is not a powerful tool because it is limited 
to the state of Delaware and a breach of fiduciary duty action takes too much time to 
timely cope with the fast decline of a financially distressed company.   The risk-shifting 
behavior translates into overinvestment because the risk-shifting projects are projects 
with net negative present value. I argue here that the risk-shifting problem is likely to be 
more pronounced in the case of securitization than secured lending because: (1) no one 
monitors the investment activities of the originator/debtor while in secured lending 
secured creditors do so41: and (2) the cash consideration received in a securitization 
transaction is typically a lump sum payment subject to no restriction while encumbrance
on the collateral usually restricts its use by the debtor in a wasteful manner.  These two 
reasons are similar in that the originator/debtor is under looser control in the case of 
securitization.
(1)  Lack of Monitoring
Secured creditors take the debtor’s credit risk.  Even if they are fully or overly 
secured, a bankruptcy petition leads to uncertainties, including the timing of the payment 
and the use of the collateral for reorganization.  Thus, secured creditors usually examine 
the debtor carefully before extending the loan and oversee the debtor’s business activities 
after the loan and debt covenants have been made.  This examination and monitoring 
helps mitigate the risk- shifting and overinvestment problem.  It is unlikely that the lender 
would extend a loan if the examination reveals that the company may go into bankruptcy 
in the near future. This is true of securitization transaction as well but the ABS investors 
tend to rely on rating agencies because their commitments are usually smaller.  The 
secured creditors are also unlikely to allow the debtor to gamble on the loaned money by 
38 See Jensen et al., supra, note 6.
39 See  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
40 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613 (Del. Ch. Dec 30,1991).  See also In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1997).
41 Lupica, supra note 5, at 628-629.  But see Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization 
and Asymmetric Information, 34 Journal of Legal Studies 161, 180 (2005).  Iacobucci et al. argues that the 
monitoring by the equity holders may force the managers to “commit not to waste free cash flow by 
securitizing assets and promising to pay out the proceeds to investors”.  This argument does not hold in the 
case of a financially distressed originator because the originator does not have much equity left and the 
equity holders therein are not entitled to such cash distribution.  
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investing on a very risky project even though such investment does not violate covenants 
discussed in the following section. The unsecured creditors would be able to count 
somewhat on such monitoring.42
In contrast, there is no incentive on the part of the ABS investors to monitor the 
activities of the originator once the asset has been transferred into the SPV.43  The ABS 
investors would probably examine the originator for fear of a weak link, but they usually 
rely on the ratings by the rating agencies because their investment in a certain ABS is not 
large enough to make any independent research monetarily worthwhile.  Once the asset is 
transferred to the SPV, the title passes to the SPV, so there is no reason for the ABS 
investors to be concerned about the business activities of the originator.  Also, there is 
usually a lump sum payment of cash consideration to the originator in securitization, 
which enables the originator to engage in a large project, while secured loans in many 
cases are revolving credit facilities where cash is requested whenever needed. Therefore, 
the originator/debtor in the securitization transaction is at greater liberty to engage in 
overinvestment.
(2)  Restriction on Activities of Origintor/Debtor
In addition to the aforementioned informal supervision on the debtor, a loan 
agreement and a security agreement contain covenants restricting the originator/debtor in 
many ways and have a stringent definition of an event of default.  There is typically a 
restriction on the ways in which the obtained cash may be spent and the collateral may be 
used.  The covenant could take a variety of forms.  For example, such covenant may 
require the debtor to get the lender’s consent before spending the obtained cash on any
projects other than those in the ordinary course of business.  It could also limit the debtor 
to use the obtained cash for a specific project only.  
Typically, there is also a covenant restricting the debtor from further encumbering
any of its assets including the collateral.   Breach of these covenants is usually an event of 
default.  Going beyond a certain threshold such as falling below the specified capital 
adequacy ratio may also be an event of default.  Because all loans usually contain cross-
default provisions, events of default would accelerate all of the debtors’ loans.  
Consequently, debtors should be very careful in keeping their activities within the 
framework set out by the covenants and other provisions.  In this way, the secured 
lending agreement limits the debtor’s ability to over invest and waste the collateral.
Securitization transfers the asset to the SPV in exchange for cash but neither the 
SPV nor the ABS investors impose restriction on the use of the cash consideration.  A 
large lump sum payment invites a financially distressed originator to overinvest as its 
shareholders urge it to do so.  
c. “Efficiency” of Securitization and Originator’s Financial Status
Securitization provides net negative value to the unsecured creditors because (1) 
liquidity at this stage is susceptible to overinvestment and because (2) the benefit of the 
ABS’s lower interest rate is not going to be sufficient to offset the harm.  Using professor 
Schwarcz’s example, assume an originator “faced with a 10% risk of bankruptcy unless it 




million of unsecured claims.”44  Also assume that the liquidity reduces the chance of 
bankruptcy by 10% to 9%.  The expected value without liquidity is (0.1 x $750,000) + 
(0.9 x $1,000,000) = $975,000.  Under professor Schwarcz’s analysis, the expected value 
with liquidity would rise to (0.09 x $750,000) + (0.91 x $1,000,000) = $977,500.  The 
previous part of this section showed that financially distressed companies which 
securitized their assets have more opportunities to overinvest than those which obtained 
their financing through secured lending.  Say, the originator with enhanced liquidity takes 
a project that has 10% chance of yielding $500,000 at the cost of $100,000.  This project 
is worth (0.1 x $500,000) + (0.9 x (-$100,000)) = - $40,000, reducing the expected value 
of the claim to $937,500.  The originator with no enhanced liquidity or which obtained 
financing through secured loan would not be able to embark on such project, because the 
former has no cash and the latter is monitored by the secured lender.  The benefit of the 
ABS’s lower interest is usually minimal in the case of financially distressed companies 
because the enhanced liquidity only slightly prolongs the originator’s solvency.  Here, 
securitization transaction reduces the unsecured creditor’s claim without increasing the 
benefit to the originator or the ABS investors.  Therefore, securitization in this particular 
case is “inefficient.”
IV.  ASSET CLASS
The securitization technique was invented in the 1970s to apply to mortgage 
receivables.45  The Government National Mortgage Association, or GNMA (Ginnie 
Mae), was the first to use the technique to enhance the liquidity among mortgage finance 
companies.46  The Federal National Mortgage Association, or FNMA (Fannie Mae), and 
Freddie Mac shortly followed suit.  Beginning in 1975, the securitization technique was 
used to securitize computer lease receivables by Sperry Corporation.47  The securitization 
asset class has since expanded, and a category like credit card receivables has now 
surpassed the securitization of mortgage payments in amount.48  In the 1990s, the 
securitization technique expanded into new types of asset classes including equipment 
payment receivables and intellectual property receivables.49  In 1997, David Bowie 
issued what are called “Bowie Bonds,” which are ABS on his music royalty receivables, 
and made a headline.50 The proliferation of asset classes subject to securitzation is 
definitely the continuing trend (see Figure 2).  But what is the impact of expanding asset 
classes in the securitization technique?
44 Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra note 1, at 1560.
45 See  OKAUCHI, supra note 8, at 209;  SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, §1:2.
46 Id. at 1-7;  OKAUCHI, supra note 8, at 209.
47 Zweig, supra note 22.
48 See  STANDARD & POOR’s, supra note 7.
49 See id.
50 Kim Clark, On the Frontier of Creative Finance: How Wall Street can Securitize Anything, FORTUNE, 
Apr. 28, 1997, at 50.
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Mortgage loans were the first asset to be securitized in the early 1980s.52  This 
quickly expended to include accounts receivable, credit card receivables, corporate loan 
receivables, and real estate receivables.  Initially, assets were limited to those that 
generated cash flows without involvement on the part of the originator after the asset had 
been transferred (traditional securitization assets).  In the case of mortgage loan 
payments, the originator screens candidates and gives approvals, but these are all pre-
securitization activities.  The originator’s post-securitization involvement or servicing is 
confined to administrative functions such as collecting payments.  Real estate receivables 
require more servicing because the originator usually takes on the marketing and 
maintains the buildings and insurance thereon in addition to collecting payments.  In this 
instance, the quality of servicing affects the cash flow prospect somewhat.
As the market for ABS expanded dramatically, so did the asset class.  The asset 
class now includes music royalties53 and inventories54 (non-traditional securitization 
assets).  The common feature among thee assets is the fact that the cash flows are 
substantially dependent on the servicer/originator’s effort.55  For instance, raw inventories 
51 See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 7.  The chart was made from the data therein.
52 See  OKAUCHI, supra note 8, at 209;  SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, §1:2.
53 See CLARK, supra note 26.
54 See In re LTV Steel, supra note 26.
55 But see Iacobucci et al., supra, note 41.
%
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need to be processed, marketed, and distributed in order to generate cash.  This is a 
significant involvement on the part of the servicer/originator, and the servicer/originator’s 
effectiveness impacts the capability of the asset to generate the cash flow.
b. “Efficiency” of Seuritization and Asset Class
Section III showed that in the event the originator-debtor securitizes its asset the 
unsecured creditors to the financially distressed companies suffer a detriment and that 
such transaction is “inefficient.”  Theoretically, the unsecured creditors may insert 
covenants to prevent securitization altogether or to let them adjust their terms when the 
originator-debtor becomes financially distressed, thus avoiding detriment to themselves 
and “inefficient” transaction.  But they fail to do so56 because securitization is a relatively 
new invention and because particularly securitization with respect to non-traditional asset 
is out of their expectation.   Securitization technique has been in existence for just three 
decades or so,57 and it was not until 1985 when the Sperry Lease Finance Corporation 
securitized its computer receivables that the technique was used outside of mortgage 
context.58   The unsecured creditors are probably aware that the originator-debtor’s 
traditional securitization assets maybe securitized later on, but they may not fully 
appreciate the impact of a securitization transaction on their recovery prospect.  As the 
unsecured creditors become more educated and insert such covenants, “inefficiency” 
pertaining to the use of the securitization technique on the traditional securitization asset 
will diminish.  
The more serious concern is regarding securitization of non-traditional 
securitization assets.  In these cases, the unsecured creditors presumably do not even 
know that the assets could be securitized.  Furthermore, it is hard to restrict the activities 
on some of these assets by inserting a covenant.59  For instance, assume an originator 
with a perfume making operation.  Because the perfume making does not require an 
extravagant facility and it does not retail the products themselves, its only substantial 
assets are accounts receivables and its inventory.  Here, the unsecured creditors to the 
perfume manufacturer probably know that the accounts receivable are securitizable, 
while they probably do not know that the inventory is.  Even if they suspected of such 
possibility and tried to prevent it, the unsecured creditors would have hard time crafting 
an appropriate covenant to restrict the originator-debtor’s dealings with its inventory, its 
only working capital, and convincing the originator-debtor to adopt it.  Moreover, should 
the unsecured creditors decide to monitor the originator-debtor’s business closely 
(monitoring of the inventory and the working capital), the cost would be prohibitive.60
The result that (1) it will be sometime before the unsecured creditors became aware of the 
assets’ securitizability and its impact on their claims; that (2) even when they become 
aware of (1), they would have difficulty addressing such concern because of the nature of 
the asset; and that “inefficient” transactions continue, unless the unsecured creditors stop 
lending altogether.61
56 See  Schwarcz, Post-Enron, supra note 1, at 1564.
57 See  OKAUCHI, supra note 8, at 209;  SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, §1:2.
58 THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 24.
59 See  Harry DeAngelo & Karen H. Wruck, Asset Liquidity, Debt Covenants, and Managerial Discretion 
in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A. Gear, 64 Journal of Fin. Econ. 3-34 (2002).




Previous sections have demonstrated that an originator may be in a financial 
distress when it securitizes its asset.  A financially distressed company is susceptible to 
engaging in overinvestment and jeopardizing the prospect of the unsecured creditors’ 
recovery.  Under the said circumstances, an overinvestment will make the transaction 
“inefficient” because the harm it creates exceeds the benefit from the ABS’s low interest 
rate and the reduced chance of bankruptcy.  Soon the unsecured creditors will realize this 
risk and try to curb it by including covenants to allow an adjustment in the loan terms to 
compensate for the heightened risk should the originator-debtor decide to securitize, or 
by monitoring the originator, reducing the chance of an overinvestment, both of which 
scenarios prevent “inefficiency.”   However, the said covenants and monitoring are not 
always available.  In the case of non-traditional securitization assets, 
creation/implementation of covenants can be difficult and the monitoring be prohibitively 
expensive.  The prominent example of the non-traditional securitization asset is 
inventory.  For some company, putting restrictions on the inventory could be disruptive 
of its operation and monitoring its handling of inventory requires close eyes on the 
business’ day-to-day operation.  In this scenario, “inefficiency” of the securitization 
could be avoided only when the unsecured creditors stop lending.  In short, securitization 
transactions are “efficient” only when the investment of the received cash is under 
control through monitoring and/or restrictions.
As one can easily see, securitization has many dimensions and it is dangerous to 
make a sweeping statement on the subject.  For instance, the proposed section 912 of 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 intended to make the securitized asset immune from 
recharacterization by bankruptcy courts. Though the provision requires the transferred 
asset to be “eligible asset” and the ABS be investment-grade, theses are no stringent 
requirements.   The definition of “eligible asset” is broader than it looks at the first 
glance.  “Financial Assets” under Section 912 (2) includes “residential and commercial 
mortgage loans, consumer receivables, trade receivables . . . plus any residential interest 
in property subject to receivables included in such financial assets plus any rights or other 
assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security 
holders.”  This list is not exclusive.  Because the non-traditional securitization asset can 
be characterized as a type of receivables – cash flow from the disposition of the 
inventory, it could easily fit into the definition of “financial asset” and thus of “eligible 
asset.”  Being an investment grade is not a high threshold either.  Fitch Ratings Services 
says BBB ratings (lowest investment-grade category) “indicate that there is currently a 
low expectation of credit risk” and that “the capacity for timely payment of financial 
commitments is considered adequate, but adverse chances in circumstances and in 
economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.”62  The ABS on LTV Steel’s 
inventory was rated BBB.63  As aforementioned, LTV Steel was not in the perfect 
financial state and had just emerged from bankruptcy when these securities were issued.  
The potential problem with the proposed legislation did not attempt to make a distinction 
between the traditional and non-traditional securitization asset, which could promote 
62 Fitch Ratings Services, Fitch Ratings Definitions, available at 
http://www.fitchratings/corporate/fitchResources.cfm?detail=1&rd_file=ltr
63 See  Plank, supra note 30, at 1688.
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free-handedly “inefficient” securitization transactions.  As the foregoing example shows, 
promoting “efficient” form of financing requires the legislator to dissect the broad 
category of securitization and pay great attention to the nuances such as the financial 
status of the originator-debtor and the asset class of the securitization.  The expansion of 
the asset class may have impact on rationale for asset securitization.  Iacobucci et al. 
based it on “information asymmetries.”64  One of the asymmetry is between the insider-
manager and the outsider-investor.  They propose the situation where the outsider-
investor has good information on the value of some assets and only the insider-manager 
knows the value of the other underlies securitization.65  This explanation does not hold 
true if the originator securitize its inventory.  Here, there is no asymmetry because the 
outsider-investor is ignorant of the value of such asset as they are of the value of the 
unsecuritized asset.  
64 Iacobucci et al., supra, note 41.
65 Id., at 180-182.
